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Minnesota v. Dickerson: "Plain Feel"
and the Expansion of Terry to Allow

Warrantless Seizures of Nonweapon
Contraband
INTRODUCTION

[Although] the Government is serious about its "war on
drugs" .

. .

. I think it obvious that this justification is unac-

ceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be
the means of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism

for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,
cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search.'

Illegal drug activity has been a salient issue with the American

public for several years, and the criminal justice system has taken
action to address this problem. 2 Courts have shown a willingness to

assist the effort to curb the nation's drug problem by resolving critical
3
Fourth Amendment questions in favor of law enforcement. Law

enforcement advocates have welcomed recent court decisions applying
the plain view doctrine4 to an officer's sense of touch ("plain feel")
in the context of an investigatory stop.5 However, some
"[c]ommentators have voiced concern that the heightened interest in
1. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686-87
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Eve).
ryone shares the Court's concern over the horrors of drug trafficking ....
Fourth
The
Narcotics:
Illegal
of
Victim
Another
Saltzburg,
3. See Stephen A.
Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4
(1986) ("The United States Supreme Court has led the way, without realizing the
extent to which it has compromised constitutional values in affirming various law
enforcement practices in criminal cases involving narcotics."); Robert J. Flora,
Project, Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 564
n.210 (1988) ("[C]ases involving the detection of illegal drugs have been the basis for
much fourth amendment law.").
4. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
5. See Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary:A Natural and Foreseeable Consequence of the Plain View Doctrine, 95 DICK. L. REV. 521, 523 (1991)
(.'[Pilain touch' is clearly a necessary and appropriate corollary to the plain view
doctrine.").
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stemming the tide of drug trafficking will erode whatever fourth
amendment protection is still afforded by the Terry v. Ohio line." '6
The United States Supreme Court had not specifically addressed
the validity of applying the plain view doctrine to a law enforcement
officer's sense of touch prior to Minnesota v. Dickerson.7 Although
the seizure of cocaine from Timothy Dickerson was invalidated, the
Dickerson Court accepted plain feel as an analogue to the plain view
doctrine.8
This note examines the Minnesota v. Dickerson decision. Part I
discusses the history of search and seizure law and how it applies to
confrontations between police and citizens. Part II presents the facts
and background of the case and discusses the United States Supreme
Court's opinion. Part III analyzes the opinion and part IV considers
the impact of allowing warrantless seizures of non-weapon contraband
in the context of a protective weapon search. Finally, the note's
conclusion expresses the author's concern that the Dickerson decision
will further erode the protections of the Fourth Amendment as a
byproduct of advancing the goal of effective drug enforcement.

I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 9 is at
the heart of the balance between the interest in preventing and
detecting crime and the interest in protecting against unwarranted
personal intrusions. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 0 Accordingly, the Court has stated that there are very few exceptions to
6. United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing
Saltzburg, supra note 3). See also Paul Finkelman, Los Angeles, April 29, 1992 and
Beyond: The Law, Issues, and Perspectives, The Second Casualty of War: Civil
Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993).
7. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
8. Id. at 2136-37.
9. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants, shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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the principle that warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment." It is not the purpose of this casenote to detail the extensive
2
history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,' however, a brief overview of the foundation upon which the Dickerson decision is predicated will provide the necessary framework.
A.

MODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The modern approach taken by the Court in resolving Fourth
Amendment questions has been to determine the reasonableness of a

warrantless search 3 by balancing the necessity of the search against

5
the level of personal intrusion. 14 In Katz v. United States, Justice

Harlan's concurring opinion asserted that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment requires that "a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and ... that the expectation be one that7
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'

1,6

In Terry v. Ohio,

the Court had occasion to apply these principles to a8 confrontation
between a police officer and a citizen on a city street.'
B.

THE TERRY V. OHIO DECISION9

The facts of Terry involved the seizure of a handgun from the
coat pocket of John Terry by Cleveland Police Detective Martin
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Katz Court stated:
"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (footnotes omitted)).
12. For a complete treatment of the Fourth Amendment, see WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed.
1987). See also Silas J. Wasserstorm, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation, of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIu. L. REV. 119 (1989).
13. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960)) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
14. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("There can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.").
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Id. at 9.
19. For an overview of the Terry decision, see Wayne R. LaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L.
REV.

40 (1968).
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McFadden.2 ° At a hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence,
Detective McFadden testified that he observed two men engaged in
suspicious conduct. 2' After deciding that these men were preparing to
rob a store, McFadden followed both of them to the front of the
store, where they were speaking to a third man. 22 Detective McFadden
then confiscated a gun from Terry. 2a
The trial court dismissed Terry's motion to suppress and found
him guilty. 24 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 25
and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. 26 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Fourth
Amendment implications of this type of police conduct. 27
1. Investigatory Stop
The Court began its analysis of the confrontation between Detective McFadden and Terry by concluding that pursuant to the requirements articulated in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, 28
Terry had a "reasonable" expectation of privacy as he walked down
the street. 29 The Court concluded that Detective McFadden's conduct

constituted a seizure of Terry's person,30 and therefore the conduct
fell under the purview of the Fourth Amendment.3 Accordingly, the
20. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
21. Id. At the hearing, McFadden testified that he observed the two men
alternately walk down the street, pausing to look into the window of a store before
continuing in the same direction. Id. at 6. According to McFadden, the men would
then turn around and walk back toward the corner, pausing again to look into the
same store window before returning to the corner to speak with the other man. Id.
After observing each man repeat this activity five or six times, McFadden observed

a third man conferring briefly with the other two men on the corner. Id. After a
short conversation, the third man left, and the other two continued their prior activity
for approximately 12 minutes. Id.
22. Id. McFadden interrogated these men, and when they did not answer his
questions, he grabbed a man he later identified as Terry, and patted down the outside
of his clothing. Id. at 7. When he felt a gun in Terry's coat pocket, he ordered the
three men into the store. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 8.
25. State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965), aff'd, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
27. Terry v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967).
28. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
30. Id. at 16. ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
31. Id. at 20.
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Court was faced with the question of whether a law enforcement
officer may detain a person on the street for questioning, without a
warrant or probable cause for arrest, if the officer believes that the
32
person is involved in criminal activity.
The Court stated that the governmental interest in crime prevention is sufficient to outweigh the individual's reasonable expectation
officer that
of privacy only upon a showing by the law enforcement
3 3 Additionally, the
specific facts existed that justified the intrusion.
circumstances leading to the seizure or search, as articulated by the
an objective conclusion by a
officer, must be sufficient to support
34
properly.
acted
officer
court that the
Although the Court in Terry concluded that Terry's actions were
suspicious,35 there was no articulation of any specific requirements
36
for initiating an investigatory stop. Justice Harlan noted this omission in his concurring opinion, and found the need to "fill in a few
37
gaps" in the majority's opinion. Justice Harlan noted that prior to
frisking a person, "the officer must first have constitutional grounds
3 He then stated what the majority had
... to make a forcible stop."
only implied: an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a
person is involved in criminal activity prior to initiating a warrantless
stop.3 9
32. Id.at 15.
33. Id.at 21.
34. Id.at 21-22.
35. Id.at 23.
36. The Court concluded that Terry's person was seized when Detective McFadden stopped him and that Terry's conduct on the street was suspicious. Id. at 16,
stating
23. However, the majority focused on the frisk and the seizure of the weapon,
taking
McFadden's
Officer
that "Itihe crux of this case . . . is not the propriety of
was
there
whether
rather,
but
behavior,
steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious
him
searching
by
security
personal
Terry's
of
invasion
justification for McFadden's
for weapons in the course of that investigation." Id. Consequently, the majority only
in its
implied that an officer had to have reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop

general discussion of Fourth Amendment policy.
37. Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 32.
issue of
39. Id. at 33. Since the decision in Terry, the Court has addressed the
See
cases.
several
in
person
a
stop
to
suspicion"
whether an officer had "reasonable
sufficient
informant
of
reliability
(finding
(1990)
332
325,
U.S.
496
Alabama v. White,
490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)
to provide reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow,
individually
considered
(holding that factors in an air traveler's behavior that, when
of the
totality
the
under
suspicion
would not be sufficient, did amount to reasonable
conduct
traveler's
(finding
(1984)
6
1,
U.S.
469
Rodriguez,
v.
circumstances); Florida
v.
in airport sufficiently suspicious to meet reasonable suspicion standard); Florida
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Protective Frisk

The second issue in Terry involved the propriety of the search
conducted by the officer. 4o Where a law enforcement officer has
reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity,
and the officer initiates an investigatory stop, the question of whether
the officer may pat down the outer clothing of the person (frisk) in
a search for weapons is raised. 4' The Terry Court observed that this
issue involved "more than the governmental interest in investigating
crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he is dealing is not armed." 42 However, the Court was unable to settle
on what was required to initiate such a frisk.43
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (finding traveler's conduct in airport sufficiently
suspicions to meet reasonable suspicion standard); Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S.
692, 703-04 (1981) (holding that a valid search warrant for a house gives officers
sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain the owner); United States v. Cortez,
449
U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (explaining that facts that would be meaningless to untrained
persons can raise reasonable suspicion when considered with permissible deductions
from the facts by trained officers). For an overview of the reasonable suspicion
standard, see Cecelia E. Kim et al., Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80
GEo.
L.J. 939, 962-71 (1992); Steven K. Bernstein, Note, Fourth Amendment-Using
the
Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, United States v. Sokolow,
80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996 (1990). The test that the Court has
developed for
determining whether the detaining officer had reasonable suspicion is a totality
of
the circumstances test that is based on an analysis of the facts from the officer's
perspective. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 ("In evaluating the validity of a stop . .
. , we
must consider 'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture."'); Cortez,
449
U.S. at 418 ("[E]vidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.").
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
41. If an officer does not have the requisite reasonable suspicion of involvement
in criminal activity that justifies an investigatory stop, the officer is not justified
in
frisking the person, even if the officer believes that the person is armed and dangerous.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 9.4(a).
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
43. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 9.4(a). The Court first stated that the requirement for initiating a frisk is that the officer must have "reason to believe that
he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual" and that this determination
must
be made in light of the officer's experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
The Court then stated that McFadden's search of Terry was reasonable because
a
"reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing
petitioner was
armed." Id. at 28. Finally, the Court summarized its holding by stating that,
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
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Subsequent decisions have held that prior to initiating a frisk, an
officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person he has stopped
is armed and dangerous. 4 In fact, in Sibron v. New York," a case

that was also written by Chief Justice Warren and decided on the
same day as Terry, the Court, citing Terry, stated that an officer who

has frisked a person for self-protection "must be able to point to
particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual
was armed and dangerous."
After deciding that the initiation of the search was reasonable,
the Terry Court was faced with the issue of the permissible scope of

the search. 47 The Court concluded that "[t]he sole justification of the
search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer
and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an
or other
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs,
'48 Although
officer."
police
the
of
hidden instruments for the assault
the Court failed to set out the specific scope of a search for weapons,
it noted that unlike an arrest, there was no interest in preventing the
and the search must

"disappearance or destruction of evidence"
to conclude in light of his experience ...

that the persons with whom he is

dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, .

.

. he is entitled for the

protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
44. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1980) (stating that protective frisk
requires reasonable belief or suspicion that the suspect is armed); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (stating that frisk requires facts that would cause
a reasonable man to conclude that a frisk was appropriate); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (stating that frisk requires officer to state "particular facts
from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous");
United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that frisk requires
"articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous");
United States v. Wangler, 987 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that frisk requires
that a reasonably prudent officer be justified in the belief that safety is endangered,
based on particular facts). Contra United States v. Michelletti, 991 F.2d 183, 184-85
(5th Cir. 1993) (stating that frisk is allowed if officer reasonably believes individual
might be armed); United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that frisk requires officer to reasonably believe that individual may be armed and
dangerous), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2418 (1993).
45. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
46. Id. at 64.
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 ("The manner in which the seizure and search were
conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted
at all.").
48. Id. at 29.
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therefore be more limited. 49 Accordingly, such a search only requires

a cursory pat of the outer clothing of the individual, and a further
patting of an item that is obviously not a weapon would exceed
this
scope.50
C.

PLAIN VIEW AND PLAIN FEEL

Another important issue, and
addressed by the Court in Terry,
conducted a valid frisk may conduct
it is determined that the individual

one which was not specifically
is whether an officer who has
a further search or seizure when
does not possess a weapon but

may possess other contraband. 5' In United States v. Williams,5 2 the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that where an officer has initiated

a valid stop of an individual, and a valid search "convinces the officer
to a reasonable certainty that the container holds contraband or
evidence of a crime," the seizure of such contraband is valid.53 The

Williams court stated that plain view principles apply to the sense
of
touch, thereby accepting a plain feel analogue to the plain
view
54
doctrine.
"Plain view" is a term used for the principle that a law enforcement officer who observes an item of contraband may lawfully
seize
the item, provided "the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly
viewed," the incriminating nature of the item was "immediately
49. Id. As one author has properly observed, "[t]he need is only
to find
implements which could readily be grasped by the suspect during the
brief face-toface encounter, not to uncover items which are cleverly concealed and
which could
be brought out only with considerable delay and difficulty." 3 LAFAVE,
supra note
12, § 9.4(b) (footnote omitted).
50. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) ("Nothing in Terry
can be
understood to allow a generalized 'cursory search for weapons' or indeed,
any search
whatever for anything but weapons.").
51. The facts in Terry did not present this issue since the officer found
a gun
in Terry's pocket. However, in~most instances where an officer conducts
a frisk, he
will come across some item in the individual's pockets or elsewhere and
the officer
may think the item is contraband. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 9.4(b).
52. 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 1184. The facts of Williams involved a warrantless
search of the
interior of

an automobile, wherein officers observed the driver attempt to conceal a
paper bag. Id. at 1176-77. The protective search principle from Terry
applies when
an officer has initiated a traffic stop. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 111-12
(1977). Additionally, Terry has been interpreted to allow an officer who
has initiated
a traffic stop to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle
for weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048-49 (1983).
54. Williams, 822 F.2d at 1182-83.
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apparent" to the officer without additional searching, and the officer
had a lawful right of access to the object." The rationale behind the
plain view doctrine is that when police officers are lawfully in a
position from which they observe an item whose incriminating nature
is immediately apparent, the owner has lost any privacy interest that
56
has taken place.
he had in the item, and therefore, no search

Accordingly, requiring an officer to obtain a warrant under these
circumstances would only delay the officer and possibly jeopardize
the evidence."

Many courts have applied the rationale of the plain view doctrine
to the sense of touch, allowing the seizure of contraband other than
8
weapons in the context of a Terry search. However, some courts
55. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
56. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (stating that observing
items in plain view does not invade owner's privacy interest); Illinois v. Andreas, 463
U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (stating that where officer's observation of an item does not
intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, no search has taken place under
the Warrant Clause).
57. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971) ("Where ...
police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless
inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves-to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant.").
58. United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the
seizure of a weapon from a pouch found in an automobile is justified under plain
feel); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that a lawful
frisk resulting in reasonable belief that subject had crack in his pocket gives officer
probable cause to search the subject's pocket), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1975 (1992);
United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that plain
feel justified officer's seizure of cocaine that was discovered after lawful frisk);
United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 429 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that seizure of
currency from paper bag found in an automobile is justified under plain feel); United
States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding seizure valid where
contents of bag were apparent), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v.
Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that evidence revealed
by touch admissible under plain feel if frisk is lawful and incriminating nature of the
evidence is "immediately apparent"); United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 95556 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding plain feel applicable
where lawful frisk convinces officer that an item is contraband); People v. Chavers,
658 P.2d 96, 102 (Cal. 1983) (finding knowledge gained by touch to be "as meaningful
and accurate" as knowledge gained by sight); State v. Vasqez, 815 P.2d 659, 664
(N.M. Ct. App.) (stating that plain feel applies if officer is reasonably certain a
container holds contraband or evidence of a crime), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 1178
(N.M. 1991); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Wis. 1992) (stating that plain view
includes evidence obtained from any of an officer's senses, including touch), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 3020 (1993). For a discussion favoring plain touch, see Holtz,
supra note 5.
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have refused to apply plain view to a law enforcement officer's sense
of touch.5 9 This was the issue presented to the Court in Minnesota v.

Dickerson.

II.
A.

MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON

FACTS

On November 9, 1989, Timothy Dickerson exited an apartment
building in Minneapolis.60 As he left the building, a Minneapolis
police officer observed him walking toward his patrol car. 6 1 According
to the testimony of the officer, Dickerson walked toward the patrol
car until he noticed the officer. 62 The officer testified that Dickerson
then turned and walked in the opposite direction around the side of
the building. 63 Although Dickerson claimed that he did not walk
toward the patrol car and did not see the officer,6 4 the trial court
accepted the officer's version of the initial encounter. 65
The officer testified that he had previously been called to the
apartment building in response to reports of drug sales taking place
in the hallways, and he had previously executed search warrants on
66

the premises.

The officer's suspicion was further aroused by Dick-

erson's evasive behavior.67 This suspicion prompted the officer to

59. State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 81-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that
frisk may only be for weapons, and there is no plain feel exception to the Fourth
Amendment); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (111.App. Ct. 1973) (stating
that where the frisking officer does not feel a weapon, he cannot seize other contents

from a pocket); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1993) (stating
that plain view
does not extend to plain feel); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380,
1381 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1990) (stating that an officer is not justified in seizing
an object unless it
reasonably resembles a weapon); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597
A.2d 616, 624 n.17
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (explaining that there is no "tactile equivalent
to the plain view
doctrine"), appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1992); State v. Broadnax,
654 P.2d 96,
102 (Wash. 1982) ("[Frisks for weapons cannot be expanded to
search for evidence
of an independent crime."). For a discussion opposing plain
feel, see David L.
Haselkorn, The Case Against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant
Requirement,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (1987).
60. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2133 (1993).
61. Id.
62. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 1992), aff'd,
113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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6
follow Dickerson into the alley in the squad car. The officer then
69
confronted Dickerson and told him to stop. A pat down search did
presence of a
not uncover any weapons, but the officer did note the
70
jacket.
Dickerson's
of
small lump in the front pocket
The officer testified that "[als I pat searched the front of his
body, I felt a lump, a small lump in the front pocket. I examined it
with my fingers and slid it and felt it to be a lump of crack cocaine
in cellophane."'" The officer proceeded to reach into Dickerson's
pocket, where he found a plastic bag with a piece of crack the size

of a marble or pea.72
B.

CASE HISTORY

Timothy Dickerson was arrested and charged with possession of
the
a controlled substance. 7 He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress
74
Court.
District
County
Hennepin
admission of the cocaine in the
The district court found that the officer had acted properly, pursuant
to Terry v. Ohio,75 when he stopped Dickerson to investigate his
76
potential involvement in criminal activity. The officer's77 pat down
search for weapons was also valid according to the court. The court
asserted that the plain view doctrine applies to an officer's sense of
touch as well as to sight because a trained officer's sense of touch is
78
as reliable as his sense of sight. Accordingly, Dickerson's motion to
79
suppress was denied. The case went to trial, and Dickerson was
found guilty.80
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that the officer had
the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop of Dickerson,
and that the officer had an "articulable objective basis to perform a
limited pat search."'" However, the court refused to adopt the plain
68. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842.
69. Id.
70. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
71. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842-43.
72. Id.
73. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
74. Id.
75. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the Terry decision, see supra notes
20-50 and accompanying text.
76. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd,
481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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feel exception to the warrant requirement and found that the officer

had exceeded the scope of the warrantless search for weapons.12 The
limited nature of the Terry weapons search prompted the appellate
court to conclude that the seizure of anything other than weapons is

not justified under Terry. 3
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals. 84 The determination by the lower courts that the
officer properly initiated both the investigatory stop and the protective
frisk was upheld. 5 However, the court took issue with the trial court's
ruling that an officer's sense of touch is as reliable as his sense of
sight.8 6 The assertion that "the sense of touch is far more intrusive
into the personal privacy that is at the core of the fourth amendment"
was also given by the court as a reason for not accepting the trial
court's ruling.87 Distinguishing plain view from plain feel, the court
stated that the plain view doctrine is justified because "observing
something that is held out to plain view is not a search at all,"
whereas "[p]hysically touching a person cannot be considered anything but a search." 88 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
declined to extend the plain view doctrine to plain feel. 89 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari 90 due to the disagreement
among state and federal courts over the admissibility of contraband
that is seized by an officer pursuant to a lawful Terry search. 91
C.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

Justice White began the majority opinion by restating that warrantless searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment unless
an exception to the Warrant Clause applies. 92 Citing Terry v. Ohio,93
82. Id. at 467.

83. Id. at 466.
84. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.

2130 (1993).
85. Id. at 843.

86. Id. at 845 (citing State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982)) ("The
tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature
of the
item. ").
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992).
91. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1993). See supra notes 5859 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 2135.
93. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1994:5851

MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON

the Court discussed the right to make "reasonable inquiries" when a
law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual
is involved in criminal activity.94 The Court also restated the Terry
holding which allows an officer who has initiated an investigatory
stop to conduct a limited pat down search of the outer clothing of
the person if the officer has a reasonable belief that the person is
armed with a weapon. 95
The Court was careful to point out that this exception to the
'limited
warrant requirement only justifies a search that is "strictly
' ' 96
because
to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons,'
of
evidence
discover
to
not
is
search
'.[t]he purpose of this limited
fear
without
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
of violence."' 97 The Court concluded the discussion by stating that if
the protective search exceeds the scope of that which is necessary to
determine whether the individual is 'armed, the search is not valid
under Terry.98

The Court then stated that contraband other than a weapon may
be seized as long as an officer does not exceed the scope of a valid
Terry weapons search. 99 The basis for this conclusion was an analogy
to the plain view doctrine.'00 The Court's discussion of this analogy
began with a recitation of the three prerequisites to a warrantless
seizure under the plain view doctrine: (1) the officer must lawfully be
in a position to view the object, (2) the incriminating nature of the
object must be "immediately apparent," (i.e. the officer must have
probable cause to believe that the item in plain view is contraband
and (3) the
without conducting some further search of the item)
0' Accordingly,
object.'
the
officer must have a lawful right of access to
the Court concluded that where
a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the
suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its
94. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2135.
95. Id. at 2136.
96. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26).
97. Id. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2137.
101. Id. at 2136-37 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)

(footnote omitted)).
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warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain view context. 0 2
The Court then addressed the per se objection that the Supreme
Court of Minnesota announced to the application of the plain view
doctrine to an officer's sense of touch. 103 Regarding the assertion by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota that the sense of touch is inherently
less reliable than the sense of sight, 1°4 the Court stated that Terry
stands for the principle that an officer can detect a weapon through
his sense of touch.,05 The Court observed that if the sense of touch is
less reliable than the sense of sight, justifying the seizure of an unseen
item will simply be more difficult, not impossible.106 .Additionally, the
Court stated that prior to seizing an item, the Fourth Amendment
requires an officer to have probable cause to believe that the item is
contraband. 107 The probable cause requirement applies regardless of
how the officer discovers the contraband, and therefore serves as a
safeguard against seizures of unidentified items. 08
Addressing the concern expressed by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota that the sense of touch is more intrusive than the sense of
sight, 0 9 the Court stated that if the pat down search for weapons is
valid under Terry, the intrusion that the Minnesota court fears has
already been justified." 0 Accordingly, if during the lawful weapons
search, the officer feels an item of contraband (other than a weapon)
whose "contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent,"
seizure of that item is no more intrusive than would be the seizure of
a weapon."'
Having completed its analysis of the application of plain view
principles to the sense of touch, the Court proceeded to evaluate the
facts of the case in light of this analysis. The Court agreed with the
102. Id. at 2137 (footnote omitted).
103. Id.

104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
105. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id. ("Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or

by touch, .

.

. the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable

cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively
speculative seizures.").

109. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993).
110. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993).
111. Id.
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lower courts that the officer in this case had adequate reasonable
suspicion to initiate an investigative stop and protective frisk of
Dickerson." 2 Therefore, the remaining question was whether the
officer exceeded the scope of Terry in the performance of his search
of Dickerson." 3 The fact that the officer did not immediately deter-4
noted."
mine the nature of the lump he felt in Dickerson's pocket was
The lower court's finding that the officer determined the contents of
Dickerson's pocket only after "squeezing, sliding, and otherwise
5
manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket"" led the Court
to conclude that the officer exceeded the bounds of a legitimate Terry

search.116

The Court began the discussion of the extent of the officer's
search by stating that
[w]here, as here, "an officer who is executing a valid search
for one item seizes a different item," this Court rightly "has
been sensitive to the danger ... that officers will enlarge a
- specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency,
into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize
at will.'''' 7
Once the officer determined that Dickerson was not armed, his
8
continued search was not related to protecting himself or others."
Therefore, the Court held that to the extent that the officer's search
proceeded beyond a search for weapons, it exceeded the permissible
scope of Terry.119
Although this holding could have concluded the analysis, the
Court continued by analogizing this case to a plain view case.120 A
discussion of Arizona v. Hicks, 2 ' where an officer seized stolen stereo
equipment while executing a valid search warrant for unrelated evi112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (stating that the officer's testimony that he determined the nature of
the lump only after manipulating it precludes finding that he immediately recognized
that it was crack).
115. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993).
116. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2138.

117. Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
118. Id. at 2138-39.
119. Id. at 2139.

120. Id.

121. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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dence,122 provided the basis for this analogy. 23 In Hicks, the Court
held that although the evidence was in plain view, the seizure was not
valid under the plain view doctrine because the officer did not have
probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. 24 The
incriminating nature of the stereo equipment was not apparent to the
officer until he moved the equipment and retrieved the serial numbers. 25 This was an act that constituted a separate search which was
not justified by the circumstances that legitimized the original search. 26
The Dickerson Court concluded that, as in Hicks, the officer determined that the item in Dickerson's pocket was crack only after moving
it around in a manner not acceptable under the plain view doctrine
27
or Terry.

Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, 28 as did Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas). 129 Both of
these opinions supported the central holding of the majority.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE INVESTIGATORY STOP AND WARRANTLESS SEARCH

The United States Supreme Court decided in Terry v. Ohio that
a police officer is justified in initiating an investigatory stop of a
122. Id. at 323.

123. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
124. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326.
125. Id. at 323.
126. Id. at 324-35.

127. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
128. Justice Scalia questioned the proposition in Terry that an officer who has
initiated a stop based on reasonable suspicion may frisk the person if he has a
reasonable belief that the person is armed. Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring). He
discussed the common law history of police conduct, and stated that at the time the
Fourth Amendment was ratified, there may not have been a right for law enforcement
officers to frisk an individual unless there was probable cause for arrest. Id.
Nevertheless, he concluded that, "though I do not favor the mode of analysis in
Terry, I cannot say that its result was wrong." Id. at 2141.
129. The Chief Justice agreed that an officer may validly seize contraband where
the identity is immediately apparent to him upon conducting a valid Terry search.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, he asserted
that the factual findings of the lower courts were insufficient and "not directed
expressly to the question of the officer's probable cause to believe that the lump was
contraband." Id. Therefore, he thought the case should have been remanded to the
Supreme Court of Minnesota for a determination that was consistent with the
majority's holding. Id.
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person based on reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in
1 In subsequent cases involving the issue of whether
criminal behavior. 30
an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop an individual, the Court
has refined this holding and developed a totality of the circumstances

test.' The Court of Appeals of Minnesota applied the totality of the
circumstances test in Minnesota v. Dickerson, and appropriately

32
concluded that the stop was valid under Terry. According to the
appellate court, the officer's stop of Dickerson was justified by the

fact that Dickerson was in a high crime area'

and was seen leaving

a house from which the officer had previously seized drugs.

34

Dick-

erson also engaged in evasive conduct by abruptly changing directions
upon making eye contact with the officer.' 3 The Supreme Court of
36
Minnesota accepted the appellate court's decision on this issue, and
Dickerson did not challenge these rulings in the United States Supreme

Court.'
Dickerson also did not challenge the lower courts' rulings regarding the propriety of the officer's search for weapons in the United
States Supreme Court, and therefore, the Court did not specifically
address this issue.' 38 According to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
the same factors that justified the officer's stop of Dickerson validated
the protective search for weapons.3 9
B. THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE

Since the propriety of the stop and frisk was not challenged by
Dickerson, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the search was within the lawful scope set out by Terry. 40
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
131. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
132. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd,
481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
133. Id. Both the Court of Appeals of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of
Minnesota pointed out that being in a high crime area alone does not justify a stop.
Id.; Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993) ("The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged
in criminal conduct." (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979))).
134. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 465.
135. Id.
136. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843.
137. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993).
138. Id.
139. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843.
140. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
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The search clearly exceeded this scope,' 14 1 and the Court properly
upheld the reversal of Dickerson's conviction. However, the adoption
of the plain feel analogue to the plain view doctrine by the Dickerson
Court is an improper expansion of Terry.
The Court has repeatedly stated that a protective search performed pursuant to a lawful Terry stop must be limited in scope to
that which is necessary for the discovery of dangerous weapons. 42 A
separate line of cases developed the plain view doctrine,' 4 1 validating
the warrantless seizure of contraband under certain conditions.'44 In
Dickerson, the Court ignored both the limited justification of the
Terry frisk and the rationale for the plain view doctrine by accepting
the propriety of applying the plain view doctrine to an officer's sense
of touch.
Courts that have rejected the application of the plain view
doctrine to an officer's sense of touch 14 have used three different
rationales for their approach. The first basis for rejecting plain feel
is the assertion that the sense of touch is less reliable than the sense
of sight. This approach was used by the Supreme Court of Minnesota
in Dickerson,'" and has also been used by other state courts. 47 The
United States Supreme Court rejected this assertion by pointing out
that both the plain view doctrine and the Fourth Amendment require
that the officer have probable cause to believe that what is seen is
contraband or evidence of crime before the item can be lawfully
seized. 148 Therefore, the result of any difference in reliability between
the senses, according to the Court, is that an officer relying on the
sense of touch will have more difficulty establishing probable cause
than an officer relying on the sense of sight.' 49
141. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
142. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
143. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 59.
146. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993).
147. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1993) ("[Ildentity and
nature of the concealed item cannot be confirmed until seen."); Commonwealth v.
Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 624 n.17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating that the sense of
touch is less "definitive" than other senses).
148. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); see Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (probable cause to believe that items in plain view
were stolen is required).
149. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
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The Dickerson Court stated that the Terry decision was founded
on the premise that an officer can'identify the nature of an object
through the sense of touch with sufficient reliability to justify a
seizure, and accordingly, probable cause can be established through
tactile sensation. 50 The purpose of the Terry search is to protect the
officer and others nearby.' Accordingly, the Terry Court stated that
a protective frisk must "be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."'15 2 Weapons and items
that could be used to assault a police officer are, by nature, hard
objects made of metal or wood that can be discovered by a quick and
limited pat search of the outer clothing of the person. However,
because of the different physical characteristics of drugs, an officer
must exceed the scope of the limited pat search authorized by the
Terry Court in order to establish the probable cause required by the
plain view doctrine.'
The second rationale that courts use to reject plain feel is that
people retain a privacy interest in items that are concealed, while no
privacy is retained in an item that is in plain view. 54 This approach55
was also used by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Dickerson.
The U.S. Supreme Court improperly rejected this point 156 by overlooking the fact that the rationale for the plain view doctrine is that
observing items in plain view does not invade the owner's privacy
150. Id.
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 29 (1968).
152. Id.

153. The Dickerson Court is correct in noting that the "premise of Terry ...

is that officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the sense of
touch." Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137. However, it is the easily identifiable nature
of weapons that is the basis of this conclusion. When law enforcement officers assert
that a Terry frisk gave them probable cause to believe that a person possessed drugs,
the scope of the frisk necessarily exceeded that which was required to discover
weapons unless the drugs were in a container that itself could be mistaken for a
weapon.
154. People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1993) ("Unlike the item in
plain view in which the owner has no privacy expectation, the owner of an item
concealed by clothing or other covering retains a legitimate expectation that the item's
existence and characteristics will remain private."); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96,
102 (Wash. 1982) ("[Dletection of evidence by sight or smell can be accomplished
without the physical intrusion of one's person, this is not so with respect to evidence
discovered by touch.").
155. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S.Ct.
2130 (1993).
156. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137-38.
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interest'57 and does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment."15 Unlike observing an item in plain view, the Terry frisk does
invade an individual's privacy interest in items that are concealed on
his person 59 and constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, the bootstrapping of plain view principles to the Terry
search is inherently flawed.
The Dickerson Court approached this issue by stating that the
intrusion that occurs when an officer conducts a pat down search is
justified under Terry, and provides the lawful vantage point required
by the plain view doctrine. However, unlike plain view cases where
evidence is discovered by the passive observation of the officer, the
cocaine in Dickerson's pocket was discovered by the more intrusive
means of a frisk.1 ° Accordingly, the plain view doctrine does not
provide a valid basis for the expansion of Terry.
The language in Terry and subsequent cases that a valid protective
search is limited to the discovery of weapons' 6' is the third rationale
used by courts to reject plain feel. 162 Although the Supreme Court of
Minnesota did not use this rationale as a basis for its holding, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that an officer may seize contraband other
than weapons that is discovered during the execution of a valid Terry
search.163
157. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (observing items in plain
view does not invade owner's privacy interest).
158. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (stating that if the officer's
observation of an item does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, no
search has taken place under the Warrant Clause).
159. See supra note 154.
160. The Dickerson Court stated that "[tihe rationale of the plain view doctrine
is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a
lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of
privacy" and therefore, no search has taken place. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137
(emphasis added). The Court then ignored this rationale by applying the doctrine to
a Terry search that clearly invaded a legitimate expectation of privacy. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language
to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search."').
161. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
162. State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("[Wiarrantless
personal intrusion is justified only to assure the safety of the officer and others.");
State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that unless
the item resembles a weapon, there is no justification for seizing it under Terry).
163. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2136 ("If, while conducting a legitimate Terry
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The Dickerson Court recognized the limited justification for a
Terry frisk, 164 but ignored this limitation by asserting that the seizure

of nonweapon contraband in the context of a Terry frisk is valid.
The Michigan v. Long decision, cited by the Court as the basis for

this proposition, is an example of the proper application of plain view

principles to a situation where Terry provides an officer with the
lawful vantage point from which he views contraband.1 65 Unlike Long

however, the facts of Dickerson did not involve the observation of
contraband.
The Terry Court described the frisk as a "serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person."' 1 This intrusion, if limited in scope,

67

is

reasonable when balanced against the interest of police officers in

taking steps to protect themselves and others nearby161-an

interest

that the Terry Court described as "more immediate" than the governmental interest in the detection of crime. 169 However, the seizure
of contraband other than weapons is not necessary for the protection
of the officer and others nearby. Accordingly, Terry does not provide
for the seizure of drugs or other non-weapon contraa justification
70
band.
The application of the principles set out in Terry to the facts of
this case justifies the Court's holding that the seizure of cocaine from
Dickerson was unconstitutional. The record supports a finding that
the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry weapon search. The
officer testified that he examined the small lump in Dickerson's pocket

search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as here, discover
contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances." (quoting Michigan v. Long, 436 U.S. at 1050)).
164. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of how Terry applies to automobile searches, see supra
note 53. The seizure in Long was justified under the plain view doctrine. Terry only
provided the officer with the requisite vantage, point from which he observed
contraband that was in plain view. Accordingly, the Dickerson Court was incorrect
to state that the seizure in Long was justified by Terry. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at
2136 ("This Court upheld the validity of the search and seizure [in Long] under
Terry.").
166. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
167. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
169. Id. at 23.
170. The language of Terry is clearly limited to weapons. Id. at 31 ("Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized
may properly be introduced in evidence .

. . .")

(emphasis added).
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with his fingers and slid it around. 7 ' A small lump the size of a pea
or marble' could not support a conclusion that Dickerson was
armed. 73 The officer's further exploration of the lump clearly exceeded the permissible scope of a valid Terry search, which must be
limited "to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives,
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police

officer.

' 174

Accordingly, the Court's plain view analogy was not

necessary to resolve the issue of this case.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's unjustified expansion of Terry to allow for the
seizure of contraband other than weapons will impact police conduct
significantly, particularly in the area of drug enforcement. 75 The ease
with which drugs can be concealed on the person 76 and the fact that
the prosecution depends on physical evidence to a greater extent in
drug offenses than in other offenses 177 complicates effective drug
enforcement.' 78 Although the Dickerson decision enhances drug enforcement, it provides significant opportunities for abuse.
When a law enforcement officer reasonably suspects that an
individual is involved in illegal drug activity, justification exists for
both an investigatory stop 79 and a protective search' 0 of the individ171. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 113 S.Ct.
2130 (1993).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 844 ("The officer's 'immediate' perception is especially remarkable
because this lump weighed 0.2 grams and was no bigger than a marble. We are led
to surmise that the officer's sense of touch must compare with that of the fabled
princess who couldn't sleep when a pea was hidden beneath her pile of mattresses.
But a close examination of the record reveals that like the precocious princess, the
officer's 'immediate' discovery in this case is fiction, not fact.").
174. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
175. A survey of the plain feel cases, supra notes 58 and 59, indicates that drugs
are the primary form of non-weapon contraband that is routinely seized in the context
of a Terry weapon search.
176. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980) ("[M]any drugs ...
may be easily concealed.").
177. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
178. See Holtz, supra note 5, at 552.
179. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
180. See United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
("Because of the increasingly violent nature of narcotics trafficking .... the need to
frisk those suspected of committing a narcotics offense in the course of a street
encounter is obvious.").
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ual. Because Dickerson enables the officer confronted with this situation to seize drugs, routine drug searches under the guise of a Terry
weapons search will frequently take place, notwithstanding the Dickerson Court's assertion that the purpose of a protective search is for
8
the protection of the officer, not the discovery of evidence of crime.1 '
In addition, the Dickerson decision will result in a greater number
of seizures of unidentified items from individuals who are suspected
of involvement in illegal drug activity. Under Dickerson, a law
enforcement officer may seize an item that is felt during a valid Terry
frisk if the incriminating nature of the item is immediately apparent
and there is probable cause to believe that the item is contraband.', 2
While conducting a lawful Terry frisk, an officer who feels an item
that could possibly be drugs will have an incentive to seize the item
regardless of whether his suspicion rises to the level of probable cause.
If the seized item is not drugs, the officer can simply release the
suspect.' 3 However, if the seized item turns out to be illicit drugs,
the officer's initial suspicion that the individual was involved in drug
activity and the fact that the individual was indeed found to possess
drugs will be sufficient to convince many courts that the officer had
the requisite probable cause.'8 4 Accordingly, this decision will result
in an increased number of unjustified intrusions on personal privacy.
The question of whether an officer had probable cause under
these circumstances is of critical significance, and judicial determination after the fact is difficult. Had the officer who frisked Dickerson
not manipulated the crack in Dickerson's pocket,' 8 5 the outcome of
this case may have been different. 8 6 Prosecutors and law enforcement

181. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 102, 107 and accompanying text.
183. See Robert Berkley Harper, Has the Replacement of 'ProbableCause' with
'Reasonable Suspicion' Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?,
22 AKRON L. REV. 13, 41 (1988) ("[Iun the case of most encounters, the intrusive
conduct of the police will escape the supervision and control of the judiciary.").
184. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA.
L. REV. 881, 884 (1991). In addition, the author asserts that the exclusionary rule
encourages officers who have seized evidence unlawfully to testify falsely. Id. ("[T]he
lack of a credible opponent (the defendant has, after all, been found with incriminating evidence) invites the police to subvert the governing legal standard by testifying
falsely at suppression hearings.").
185. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
186. A law enforcement officer's training and experience may result in judicial
acceptance of an officer's testimony that the facts were sufficient to give him probable
cause to believe an item was contraband where the facts would not lead the ordinary
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agencies will certainly be cognizant of this, and police officers will be
trained accordingly.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court
improperly expanded Terry v. Ohio to allow the seizure of nonweapon contraband. The Court reached this result by adopting a plain
feel analogue to the plain view doctrine. 17 To create this new exception
to the Warrant Clause, the Court ignored both the rationale of the
plain view doctrine and the limited justification for the Terry frisk.
This decision will have a significant impact on future confrontations between police and citizens. After Dickerson, law enforcement
officers will have the ability to search a suspect for drugs based solely
on the reasonable suspicion required by Terry. Accordingly, such
searches will likely become standard procedure for law enforcement
agencies, resulting in an increased number of unjustified intrusions
on the personal privacy that lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
Given the significance of the country's drug problem and the
action taken by both the executive and legislative branches,' 88 it is
understandable that courts have joined the war on drugs by resolving
Fourth Amendment questions in favor of more invasive law enforcement techniques.l8 9 However, as Justice Brennan has said, "[e]veryone
shares the Court's concern over the horrors of drug trafficking, but
under our Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth
Amendment may be employed by the government to cure this evil." ,90
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person to the same conclusion. One court pointed out that:

[a]s law enforcement officials' knowledge of the narcotics industry expands
and the tools and techniques of the trade shift, the indicia of suspicion and
degree of import attached to each will also change. Those indicia must be
evaluated "not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood

by those versed in the field of law enforcement."

United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

187. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
188. See Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 1-2.

189. See supra note 3.

190. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

